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ABSTRACT

The purpose o f this work is to show how American culture, ideology,
experience, and politics influenced the formation of President Harry Truman’s
Non-Recognition policy towards Communist China from 1949 to 1953.
Its thesis is that foreign policy, which is shaped by ideology, culture and
experience, is the extension of domestic affairs in both acting and reacting to
external changes and challenges. Misperception and misunderstanding, caused by
different cultural beliefs, inadequate information, and underlying ideological
differences, were the main causes o f the hostile relations between the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) and the United States.
Chapter I examines the formation and the influence of the China myth and
the American disillusionment over the Communist victory in China. Chapter II
narrates the chain of events from 1949 to early 1950 that affected Sino-American
relations. It also explains the causes of Anglo-American differences. Chapter III
describes the internal and external factors preventing United States recognition of
the Communist regime in China.
The conclusion o f this study is that the China myth played a significant
role in shaping America’s perception about the rise of Communist China. The
myth also aided the rise of McCarthyism and ensured the success o f the China
Lobby and China Bloc in the United States. These domestic political pressures
kept the Truman administration from recognizing the PRC.
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LOST CHANCES IN SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS:
THE BURDEN OF MYTH, CULTURE, AND IDEOLOGY
1949-1950

INTRODUCTION

When the United States and Britain faced the problem of whether to
recognize the newly formed communist government in China in October, 1949,
these two close allies acted differently.

The British government favored

extending recognition to the new Chinese Government, but the United States
government refused to do so. Why?
This essay analyzes the influence of American culture, ideology,
experience, and politics on the formulation of U.S. foreign policy towards
Communist China from 1949 to 1953. Its thesis is that foreign policy, which is
shaped by ideology, culture and experience, is the extension of domestic affairs in
both acting and reacting to external changes and challenges. Misperception and
misunderstanding, caused by different cultural beliefs, inadequate information,
and underlying ideological differences, were the main causes o f the hostile
relations between Communist China and the United States. Their confrontation
reflected the clash of divergent cultures and national interests. Although many
historians blame the Chinese Communists’ hostile actions for causing the tensions
in early Sino-American relations, Americans have no way to escape their own
responsibility.
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The formation o f Harry S. Truman’s policy of non-recognition is the focus
o f analysis.1 The Non-Recognition policy initially was not within President
Truman’s long-term China policy agenda and was debated again and again
between 1949 and 1950 within the administration.

After China entered the

Korean War in November 1950, the Non-Recognition policy was fixed and
became almost commandment left for Truman’s successors in dealing with
Communist China. The United States not only refused to recognize the Beijing
government, but also tried to prevent other western countries from doing so.
The Non-Recognition policy indeed survived for about thirty years, from
1949 to 1979, longer than the time it took the the United States to recognize the
Soviet Union.2 Moreover, since not recognizing China was the first step of the
Containment and Isolation Strategy,3 analyzing the formation of the NonRecognition policy can help to discover the underlying causes of the long period
of Sino-American hostility. This essay examines the gradual development of the
Non-Recognition policy and analyzes what factors caused it to be fixed from
1950 onward.

1 Sino-American relations in this paper refer to the relations between the People’s Republic of China and the
United States o f America.
2 The United States refused to recognize the Bolsheviks in 1917. This policy continued until Franklin D.
Roosevelt entered the White House in 1933. President Roosevelt decided to recognize the Soviet Union in
November 1933.
3 The Containment and Isolation Strategy, formed by Truman after the Korea War broke out in June 1950,
aimed at preventing the spread of communism in Asia by containing and isolating Communist China, similar
to the case o f containing Soviet Union in Europe after the World War II. The Non-Recognition Policy was
part o f the Containment and Isolation Strategy against China.
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There are three chapters in this essay. Chapter I examines the China myth
and the American disillusionment over the Communist victory in China. Chapter
II narrates the chain of events from 1949 to early 1950 that affected SinoAmerican relations. It also explains the causes of Anglo-American differences.
Chapter III describes the internal and external factors preventing United States
recognition o f the Communist regime in China.
It is hoped that through these three chapters, readers will understand
foreign policy is not simply a reaction to external change but an extension of
domestic affairs. Most importantly, not only political, strategic, and economic
factors, but also cultural and ideological factors, influence a country’s foreign
policy. Within American Studies, foreign policy is an important way by which
students may better understand American ideology, experience and culture and
thereby help to explain how Americans respond to external changes and why
Americans choose one policy out of many alternatives.

The China myth

demonstrated how American culture and experience distorted perception and
understanding of external changes, and how what Americans experienced and
thought affected policy makers.

CHAPTER I
THE CHINA MYTH

The problem o f recognition arose in early 1949 when the Nationalist
Government, controlled by the Kuomintang (KMT), was about to be defeated by
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The issue of whether the United States
government should recognize the new Communist regime in Beijing occupied
American foreign policy makers. The controversy was intensified by the work of
the China Lobby, a strong lobbying group formed during the war with Japan by
Nationalist officials to press for more American aid to the Nationalist
Government.

In addition, the competition between the two political parties,

Democratic and Republican, exacerbated the controversy. Although the power to
make foreign policy lies in the executive branch of government, the President and
the State Department, the Constitution provides Congress the power to exert
influence on foreign policy through its “advice and consent” and its role in
ratification of treaties. It is through the elected Congress that the China Lobby
and political party differences worked in combination with American culture and
a distinctive ideology to affect American interpretation o f and policy toward
changes in China.
As Charles B. Marshall, a member of the Policy Planning Staff of the
State Department, pointed out on March 17,1952:
Ends are concepts. Means are facts. Making foreign policy consists o f meshing

5

6
concepts and facts in the field o f action. ... To me the phrase “national interest”
does not mean a set o f aims arrived at without regard to value. I could not think o f
our foreign policy except in relation to the character o f the Nation and its political
institutions. That has a bearing on the choice o f means in the conduct o f foreign
policy.1

There are many ways to react to external changes.

According to Marshall,

national character, value, experience and political institutions were major factors
affecting the conduct of American foreign policy. In other words, ideals such as
freedom, democracy, liberty, capitalism, American exceptionalism, manifest
destiny, materialism, and anti-intellectualism influenced American foreign policy
making. These ideals, to a great extent, were the causes o f the China myth, which
was the erroneous perception o f China held by many Americans.

This myth

distorted the way Americans interpreted radical changes within China in the late
1940s. According to Robert Jervis, a leading scholar in international relations,
misunderstanding and misperception were failures of communication “largely
caused by unrecognized differences in evoked sets (immediate concerns) created
by different geographical perspectives, time lags, and contrasting experiences.”2
The American people’s culture, values, experience and ideology were the main
causes o f their misperception and misunderstanding o f the success o f the CCP.3
America regarded itself as a special friend of China.

According to

historian Michael H. Hunt, “the concept o f a special relationship [between China
1 George C. Marshall, “The Nature o f Foreign Policy,” Department of State Bulletin. Vol.XXVI, No.661
(March 17, 1952), p.416.
2 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics. (New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 1976), p.207.
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and America] ... had become a staple of both popular and official rhetoric, [that
persisted into the] mid-[twentieth] century and beyond.”4 Americans believed
that they were exceptional because unlike European imperialists, who had great
political and territorial ambitions in China, they had no such ambition.

They

simply wanted to share their spiritual and material blessings with the Chinese
people by sending merchants, ships, and missionaries to China.5 They believed
that their non-aggressive policy aims were demonstrated by the Open Door Notes
in 1899 and 1900.6 They further viewed the Washington Conference in 1920 as
the greatest achievement in upholding China’s territorial and administrative
integrity by persuading Japan to return the province of Shandong to China.
Moreover, America supported China to be one of the permanent members, with
veto power, in the United Nations Security Council.

The United States

government also gave tremendous economic and military aid to Chiang Kaishek’s Nationalist Government for the war against Japan and recovery afterwards.
According to the State Department’s estimation, in the previous thirteen years
(from 1937 to 1950) the United States had sent aid to China at a rate greater than

3 See Huo Shiliang, “American Idealism and East Asia,” American Studies. (Published by the Chinese
Association for American Studies and the Institute of American Studies Chinese Academy of Social Science)
Vol.6, No.2 1992, p.36.
4 Michael H. Hunt, The Making of a Special Relationship: The United States and China to 1914. (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1983), p.299.
5 See Huo, “American Idealism and East Asia,” pp.38-39. Huo points out that based on the idea o f Manifest
Destiny and Christian mission, American people believed that they were having a ‘American (democratic)
experiment5 that other countries should follow their example.
6 The First Open Door Note was sent by John Hay, the secretary of state, on September 6, 1899, to Japan,
Germany, Russia, Britain, France, and Italy, asking them to maintain the territorial and administrative
integrity of China. The Second Open Door Note was sent by Secretary Hay on July 3, 1900 when the Boxer
Uprising broke out, asking the powers to preserve China’s territorial and administrative entity.
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100 million dollars a year, not including lend-lease and military aid.

For

example, in 1948, the United States Congress had approved 275 million dollars of
economic aid and 125 million dollars of special grants to Chiang’s Nationalist
Government.8 No other country or people in the world had done more for the
well-being of the Chinese people than America. Historian Michael H. Hunt has
concluded that:
Through times o f trial in China brought on by renewed foreign aggression or
internal unrest, Americans held to the reassuring myth o f a golden age o f
friendship engendered by altruistic American aid and rewarded by ample Chinese
gratitude.9

Due to the previous hundred years of sympathy and charity toward the Chinese,
Americans strongly believed that they were a “special” friend o f China.
The majority o f Chinese, however, did not cherish the belief of a special
friendship. Many Chinese regarded Americans as western imperialists who came
to China to destroy their empire and their Confucian civilization. Chinese viewed
their country as the “Middle Kingdom” —the center of the world —and believed
that they were culturally superior to all races.

Nearly all o f the countries

surrounding China were its tributary states. Thus, it was in the foreigners’ best
interest to establish relations with China, but not in the best interest of the
Chinese. Although the unequal treaty system broke China’s isolation and closed
door policy, the attitude o f most Chinese people did not change much.

The

7 Statement by Ambassador Warren R. Austin, “U.S. Appeals to Chinese Communists To Stop Aggression
in Korea,” Department o f State Bulletin. Vol.XXIII, No. 598 (December 11, 1950), p. 932.
8 Statement by Dean Acheson, “American Policy Toward China,” Department of State Bulletin. Vol.XXIV,
N o.625 (June 18, 1951), p.972.
9 Hunt, The Making of a Special Relationship, p.299.
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Chinese, in fact, blamed western encroachment as the main source of their
political and economic calamities.

Although Americans were not particularly

aggressive in comparison with the English, the German, the French and the
Japanese, the Chinese did not differentiate between Westerners. They tended to
regard all foreigners “as cut of the same cloth, and thus any image of
[W esterners inevitably included the Americans.”10 During the Boxer Uprising
(1898-1900), for example, American missionaries in China were the major target
of attack with many o f them being killed.
The Chinese Communists preached the ideas of anti-imperialism and
nationalism, and promised that the Communist revolution would build a strong
and independent “new” China. Therefore, when the CCP took power in China in
1949, it stirred up these long-term anti-foreign feelings and directed people to
attack and humiliate foreign officials, missionaries, and businessmen. Harassed
Americans in China, consequently, burned with anger and frustration. They could
not understand why the Chinese hated them so much. Thus, it was natural for the
United States to conclude that all these confrontations were not due to Chinese
hostility, but were of Russian origin instead.
As historian Stephen E. Ambrose has pointed out:
Americans high and low implicitly assumed that with good policies and enough
will, the United States could control events anywhere. If things did go wrong ... it
could only happen because o f mistakes, not because there were areas o f the
world in which what American did or wanted made little difference. The
10 Quoted by William L. Neumann, “Determinism, Destiny, and Myth in the American Image of China,”
Issues and Conflicts: Studies in Twentieth Century American Diplomacy, ed. George L. Anderson.
(Lawrence: University of Kansas, 1959), p. 17.
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assumption that in the end every situation was controllable and could be made to
come out as the United States wished -- what Senator William Fulbright later
called “the arrogance o f power” —colored almost all foreign-policy decisions in
the early Cold War.11

This pride was clearly based on the idea of American exceptionalism. American
people regarded themselves more pure, innocent, and righteous than other people.
The success o f the two World Wars “contributed to the conceit that the United
States could order the world,” in the words of historian Ambrose.12 They thought
that American Democracy represented the best and strongest governmental
system in the world. One of the Founding Fathers James Madison had said:
The free system o f government we have established is so congenial with reason,
with common sense, and with universal feeling, that it must produce approbation.
... Our country, if it does justice to itself, will be the workshop o f liberty to the
civilized world, and do more than any other for the uncivilized.13

James Madison’s words became the beacon o f American foreign policy making.
His words showed the faith American people had in their political system, the use
of common sense, and the concept o f liberty. President Truman stated that the
foreign policy objective of America in the Cold War Era was to: “Proclaim
Liberty throughout all the land unto all the inhabitants.”14 Americans had a belief
that they were doing the right thing for other nations or for the well-being of the
whole world, but other nations had their own principles and might not appreciate
what the United States considered best.

11 Stephen E. Ambrose, Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938. (New York: Penguin
Book, 1985), p. 110.
12 Ibid., p. 110.
13 Quote by Adrian S. Fisher, “The Principal Ingredients of U.S. Foreign Policy,” Department of State
Bulletin. Vol.XXVI, No.660 (February 18, 1952), pp.244-245.
14 Harry Truman, “The Defense of Freedom,” Department of State Bulletin. Vol.XXV, No.628 (July 9,
1951), p.86.
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Adrian S. Fisher, the legal Adviser of the State Department, pointed out on
February 18, 1952 that “America’s fortunate situation and what [they had] learned
along the road that brought [them] to it imposes upon [them] an obligation to the
rest of mankind.”15 In other words, Americans had a special vision o f their own
role in the world’s future. Owen Lattimore, a China specialist, wrote in 1940,
“The key to the future of China lies neither in Japan nor in Russia, nor even in
China itself. It lies right here in America.”16 In fact, many people at that time
assumed that “America was destined to guide a new China to industrialism,
democracy, and a life of material well-being.”

1n

George Kennan, foreign policy

adviser in the early Cold War, regarded this as “a tendency to create hazy and
exalted dreams o f intimacy with other peoples,” especially toward Chinese.18 It
was ironic that Americans thought of themselves as exceptional when they were
pursuing similar political and economic ambitions that European powers had
pursued in China and Asia for more than a century. What the American people
and government believed in was a myth. This myth combined with a faith in their
own potential to overwhelm the reality of Chinese politics and cultural changes.
Because of this myth, Americans viewed the loss of China to Communism
as a challenge to their leadership role in China.

Furthermore, the loss of a

potentially lucrative Chinese market caused great concern. Communism would

15 Adrian S. Fisher, “The Principal Ingredients o f U.S. Foreign Policy,” Department of State Bulletin.
Vol.XXVI, No.660 (February 18, 1952), p.245.
16 Quoted by Neumann, “Determinism, Destiny, and Myth in the American Image of China,” p. 1.
17 Ibid., p.l.
18 Ibid., p. 14. See also “The Future of Soviet Communist,” The New Leader. June 18, 1856, p.4.
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mean a closed economic system similar to the Soviet Union and that there would
be no free trade and no free flow of information.

American economic and

cultural expansion would be halted. In this sense, ideological differences became
the fundamental focus of hostile debate between Beijing and Washington after
1949. Jealous and angry feeling weakened American policy makers’ ability to
examine the realities. There was a strong tendency to attribute the success of the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to the Soviet Union, which in turn deepened the
fear of the Soviet Conspiracy. John Foster Dulles, a consultant to the secretary of
state, wrote in early 1950:
The loss o f China to Communists, who, it now seems will work in Asia as junior
partners o f Soviet Communism has had tremendous repercussions throughout the
world. It has marked a shift in the balance o f power in favor o f Soviet Russia and
to the disfavor o f the United States.19

From the American perspective, the loss of China to Communism upset the post
war balance of power between the Soviet Union and the United States. President
Franklin D. Roosevelt had expected China to be the American junior partner in
Asia. Thus, when the CCP gained power in China, Americans were alarmed, and
they determined to resist any further Communist expansion.

The Non-

Recognition policy was the beginning of this resistance.
For many years, historians argued about the role of ideology in influencing
American foreign policy.

One group, by Louis Hartz, Edward Weisband, and

Michael Hunt, stressed that ideology can never be detached from foreign

19 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations o f the United States. 1950. Vol. I. (Washington DC.:
Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 314.
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policy and that foreign policy is constantly influenced by ideology.

on

Hunt

defined ideology in American foreign policy in terms o f its historical and cultural
origins -- “racial hierarchy,” “liberty,” and “fear o f revolution.”

He further

argued that these deeply rooted cultural traditions were the main force in linking
ideology to foreign policy making.

01

Stephen Krasner applied this interpretation

to individual policy makers’ decisions in the twentieth-century. He wrote:
During this period American leaders were moved by a vision o f what the global
order should be like that was derived from American values and the American
experiences —Lockean liberalism, and a nonrevolutionary, democratic,
prosperous historical evolution.22

Krasner believed his interpretation explained why President Harry Truman and
Secretary of State Dean Acheson were so concerned about losing China to
communism and so disliked the policies o f the Chinese communists. Americans’
reactions to the radical changes in China, to a great extent, were governed by
American cultural values and beliefs.
The other group, lead by George Kerman, disagreed. Kennan stressed that
the American foreign policy experts could detach themselves from ideological
dogma to grasp the reality o f international affairs through their collective
wisdom.

23

Walter Lippmann also advocated this opinion.

He believed that

20 See Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America. (New York: Harcourt Brace & World, 1955), pp.5859; Edward Weisband, The ideology of American Foreign Policy. (Beverly Hills, California: Sage, 1973),
p.61; Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy. (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press,
1987), pp. 17-18.
21 Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy, p. 17-18.
22 Stephen D. Kransner, Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign
Policy. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1978), p. 15.
23 See George Kennan, American Diplomacy. 1900-1950. (New York: New American Library, 1951),
Chap. 5.
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American foreign policy should be pragmatic and disavow ideology.

24

Later

historians like Norman Graebner and Arthur Schlesinger further argued that
ideology should be separated from foreign policy and that being practical was the
most important principle for foreign policy making.

Hans Morgenthau claimed

that ideology, rather than a guide to foreign policy, was a random and confusing
factor.26
It is important to note that the second group of historians never deny that
ideology influences foreign policy. In fact, the strength o f ideology in affecting
foreign policy varies historically, not always as strong as Hunt’s claim and not
always as insignificant as Morgenthau believed. In Sino-American relations from
1949 to 1953, however, ideology was very important to the clash between
capitalism and communism, according to historian Jie Chen.

97

But the clash

between Chinese and American cultures was equally important as well.28 The
following two chapters will demonstrate the significance of American culture,
values, and ideology in affecting the United States government’s response to the
rise of communism in China.

24 See Walter Lippmann, Cold War: A Study in U.S. Foreign Policy. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974).
25 See Norman A. Graebner, America as a World Power: A Realist Appraisal from Wilson to Reagon.
(Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1985); Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., “Foreign Policy and the American
Character,” Foreign Affairs. (Fall, 1983), pp. 1-16.
26 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, revised by Kenneth W. Thompson. (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1985), p.87.
27 See Jie Chen, Ideology in U.S. Foreign Policy: Case Studies in U.S. China Policy. (Westport,
Connecticut, London: Praeger, 1992), p. 15.
28 Gabriel A. Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy. (New York: Praeger, 1960), p. 105.

CHAPTER II
THE PROBLEM OF RECOGNITION

In late 1948, the Chinese Civil War was in its critical final stages.
Following a series of stunning Communist military victories in northern China,
the CCP conquered Manchuria in November, threatening Tienjin and Beijing, two
important Chinese cities.

On January 26, 1949, the Nationalist government

informed American Ambassador J. Leighton Stuart and other diplomatic mission
chiefs that the Chinese government (KMT) would move its capital from Nanjing
to Guangzhou and asked diplomatic missions to move there as well.1 The
Truman administration had to decide whether to keep Ambassador Stuart in
Nanjing or follow the KMT to Guangzhou. Although it seemed that the United
States faced the question o f Nanjing or Guangzhou, the real question was to stay
or leave because the KMT would lose the civil war.

The United States

government, therefore, had only two choices: it could either completely withdraw
from China or stay in order to protect American interests.2 Eventually, President
Truman ordered Ambassador Stuart to stay. This decision reflected Washington’s
initial hope to maintain normal diplomatic channels of communication for future
negotiation. Another major question was: Should the United States government
recognize the Communist government in Beijing at that time. Concerning this

1 Edwin W. Martin, Divided Counsel: The Anglo-American Response to Communist Victory in China.
(Lexington: The University Press o f Kentucky, 1986), p. 2.
2 Ibid., p.7.
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question, keeprng Stuart in Nanjing showed the “wait-and-see” attitude of the
Truman administration. The United States government, moreover, urged other
Western powers to maintain a “united front” of not recognizing the Beijing
regime.
Since the administration of President Woodrow Wilson, the United States
had developed a set for moral constructs and principles of conducting foreign
policy.

“Wilsonian” is a term used to describe the policies that emphasized

internationalism and moralism and were designed to extend freedom and
democracy.

Wilson feared radical and revolutionary change, believing that

maintaining order was crucial for prosperity. He, thus, believed that the United
States should not recognize any new revolutionary regime that disregarded
international law, refused to repay its national debts, threatened order and
stability, was controlled by a foreign power, or seized power through immoral
means. Under traditional policy dating back to Thomas Jefferson, the United
States usually recognized any government which maintained order and agreed to
meet foreign obligations, such as debts. Wilson, however, added a third criterion:
the new government had to come to power through a process that was accepted by
the United States. Based on Wilson’s new criteria, the United States refused to
recognize the Bolsheviks in Russia in 1917 because they were seen as German
agents; they refused to pay back the national debts (under the Tsar’s rule) and
seized power immorally. The United States government also believed that non
recognition would help to undermine the survival of a new revolutionary regime.

17
After this, recognition became a diplomatic weapon. The Truman administration
inherited Wilson’s values and practical concerns. It intended to use diplomatic
pressures, such as granting recognition and economic aid, to press the Chinese
Communists to yield to its demands.
The attitude of the CCP, however, was quite different. The Communists
“were not going to play the diplomatic game by the international rules practiced
in the West if it did not suit them,” according to historian Edwin W. Martin.3
This meant that the CCP would not follow any normal diplomatic practices in
dealing with the western powers. Shi Yinghong, a Chinese historian, charges that
Wilson’s refusal to recognize governments, which gained power through
“unconstitutional means,” established “the precedent of American intervention
into other nations’ domestic affairs.”4 Shi also believes that Wilson’s principle of
international responsibility was designed to target those “revolutionary countries”
which “determined to transform foreign relations and cast off imperialistic
oppression.”5 The Communists’ aim indeed was to eliminate all western imperial
influences in China. These divergent attitudes and objectives marked an initial
rift between the two countries. As a result, while the United States wanted to
force the Chinese communists to yield, the CCP pushed the United States to yield.

3 Ibid., p.8.
4 Yinhong Shi, “Problems concerning the American recognition of New China,” (“Lun Meiguo Chengren
XinZhongguo Wenti, 1949-1950), World History TChina] fShiiie Lishil N o.l (1991), p. 102.
5 Ibid., p. 102.
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Because of these differences, they further misinterpreted and misunderstood each
other in the coming years.
The first significant conflict appeared when the CCP captured Mukden on
November 1, 1948. According to William N. Stokes, American vice consul in
Mukden, “the Communist command in Mukden surrounded the American
Consulate General with troops, cut off its electricity and water, and placed the
entire establishment under incommunicado house arrest.”6 The United States
government tried many ways to contact the Mukden Consulate, but failed, and the
incident became one of the significant barriers for improving relations between
the CCP and the Truman administration.

The CCP stressed their position that

“in the absence of recognition or diplomatic relations, consular officials were
merely private persons not entitled to carry out official function.”8 The United
States government, nevertheless, had another view that “international custom has
sanctioned continued exercise by resident foreign consuls o f their legitimate and
proper functions within their consular districts even during periods of non
recognition” between governments.9
On October 24, 1949, the Mukden Consul General Angus Ward and four
members of his staff were formally arrested by the Chinese Communists on the

-->►73

6 William N. Stokes, “The Future between America and China,” Foreign Service Journal. January 1968,
.15. See also Edwin W. Martin, Divided Counsel, p.8.
Sino-American relations in this paper refers to the relations between the new Communist China and the
United States.
8 Martin, Divided Counsel, p. 12.
9 Quoted by Ibid., p.9.

19
charge Ward and his staff beat their Chinese employees.
government reacted strongly.

The United States

Washington regarded this action as a “clear

violation of established principles o f international comity and practice respecting
treatment o f foreign consular officials.”10

The State Department urged

communist Chinese officials to handle the issue according to the “established
principles o f international law and practice respecting treatment of foreign
consular officials,” and demanded transportation facilities so that American
officials could leave Mukden.11 However, the United States government never
mentioned what was really going on in Mukden or why Mukden was singled out.
According to historian Michael H. Hunt, the Ward incident was an American
responsibility because the Mukden consulate was the center o f an American
espionage network.

Historian Nancy Bemkopf Tucker also points out that the

United States conducted espionage work through the Mukden consulate,
“providing Chinese [Nationalists] agents with radio transmitters and secret
codes.”

13

4

The incident finally was resolved after Ward was released on

November 21, 1949 and expelled from China.
When Philip Fugh, Ambassador Stuart’s adviser, asked about Mukden
and other similar incidents, Huang Hua, the chief of the Alien Affairs Office,

10 U.S. Department of State, “No Response From Chinese on Release of Angus Ward and Staff,”
Department o f States Bulletin. Vol.XXI, N o.542, (November 21, 1949), p.760.
11 Ibid., p.760. See also Foreign Relations of the United States. 1949. Vol.VHI, p. 1002.
12 Michael H. Hunt, “Mao Tse-tung and the Issue o f Accommodation with the United States, 1948-1950,”
Uncertain Years: Chinese-American Relations. 1947-1950. ed. by Dorothy Borg and Waldo Heinrichs.
(New York, 1980), p.203-204.
13 Nancy Bemkopf Tucker, Patterns In the Dust: Chinese American Relations and the Recognition
Controversy 1949-1950. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), p.44.
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replied that “as soon as normal diplomatic relations [were] established, all such
issues could be easily cleaned up.”14 Huang’s words revealed how important
diplomatic

recognition

was

for the

Chinese

Communists.

America’s

unconditional recognition represented the acceptance of the new government
internationally, which would pave the way for the Beijing government to replace
the KMT as the permanent member of the Security Council in the United Nations.
It could also help the new government to strengthen its rule over China.

For the

CCP, recognition could enhance its position and bargaining power within the
Communist bloc. For most of the Chinese, recognition meant the triumph of
Chinese nationalism and it signified China would enter the international
community as an equal player. Also, recognition would provide access to western
economic aid, which was crucial for China’s devastated economy.
importantly,

if the

United

States

recognized

the

Beijing

More

government

unconditionally, it would signify America’s friendly attitude towards the Chinese
Communists. The CCP, in turn, would feel more secure and be less hostile to the
United States.
Therefore, the CCP hoped that the Mukden debacle would press the
United States for early recognition of the People’s Republic o f China (PRC). The
Mukden incident, however, deepened the misunderstanding between the two
countries and worsened the prospects of American recognition. During a meeting

14 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States. 1949. Vol. VIII, p.378.
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with Under Secretary of State James E. Webb, President Truman expressed his
anger by saying that the United States should “thoroughly explore the possibility
o f blocking the movements of coal down the coast of China to Shanghai,” and
“[sinking] any vessels which refused to heed [American] warning,” in order to
demonstrate the strong position of the United States on Ward’s release. Truman
also believed that such a move would slow British action towards recognition.15
Although the American navy did not sink any Chinese vessels, Truman’s ideas
showed Washington’s frustration with the Ward case.
More importantly, the Ward case aroused public anger in the United
States. Americans were not only angry about the hostile action o f the CCP, but
also suspected the presence of strong Soviet influence in Manchuria, which
strengthened the idea that the CCP was the puppet of the Soviet Union. Publicly,
the Ward incident was presented as an obstacle to recognition of the PRC when it
was established on October 1, 1949. According to a journal Monthly Report,
which was published by the Millard Publishing Company in November 1949 in
Shanghai, the American Government was actually using the Ward incident to
delay recognition.16 It said, “Most political observers here agreed that American
recognition would not have been forthcoming irregardless [sic] of the Ward
incident.”17 Though Ward and his staff were released on November 21, 1949,

15 Ibid., p. 1008.
16 See Lanxin Xiang, “The Recognition Controversy: Anglo-American Relations in China, 1949,” Journal of
Contemporary History. Vol.27. No.2 (1992), p.330.
17 Quoted by Ibid., p.330.

22

considerable harm had already been done.

The incident strengthened

Washington’s determination to close some consular offices in the interior of
China and only keep those in big cities open.

In short, the Ward incident

reflected that Beijing and Washington interpreted the international rules and
practice — the treatment of foreign diplomats — totally differently and none of
them were going to make any concession.
From early 1949 to the establishment of the PRC on October 1, 1949,
Beijing did not show much interest in the United States except in two special
cases. The first one was Chou En-lai’s letter to Ambassador Stuart concerning
economic aid on May 31, 1949. The second one was the invitation by Mao Tsetung and Chou En-lai to Ambassador Stuart to visit Beijing, on June 28, 1949.
These two Communist initiatives were quite significant because they showed that
there was a possibility that the two countries could improve their relations during
the first half of 1949. In fact, from January 1949 to August 1949, the United
States government upheld its decision to keep its ambassador in Nanjing after the
Communist occupation. Britain, during that time, also kept its ambassador there.
Ambassador Stuart hoped that his presence might help to remove CCP’s
suspicion and maintain a channel of communication.

1R

Thus, in the period before

Ambassador Stuart left China, there were some opportunities for the two

18 Martin, Divided Counsel, p. 25.
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countries to improve their relations and resolve their misunderstandings. Chou's
letter and Mao’s invitation were the golden opportunities.
During 1949, Ambassador Stuart and his staff members met Huang Hua
many times to discuss their diplomatic objectives.

In one such meeting between

Huang and Philip Fugh on May 6, 1949, Huang said clearly that the CCP’s main
objectives were “to eliminate (1) feudalism and (2) American and British
imperialism” in China.19 Therefore, the United States should have known what
the Communists wanted. The CCP had already stressed that Americans should
stay out o f Chinese internal affairs. These demands, however, were against
American interests.

Washington expected the new China to follow American

directions and to be its junior partner in Asia. When China fell into the hands of
the Communists, the United States tried every means to press the CCP to follow
American demands. Recognition was regarded by Washington as an effective
weapon which Washington hoped would make Beijing yield. Therefore, on June
2, 1949, when Huang Hua mentioned the issue of recognition by the United States
based on “equality and mutual benefit,” Ambassador Stuart said that the United
States would recognize the PRC if the CCP accepted international practice with
respect to treaties.20
For the CCP, “equality and mutual benefit” meant that the United States
should stay out of Chinese internal affairs and give up all its special rights and

19 Ibid., p.29.
20 Ibid., p.29.
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privileges in China.

Although the United States had officially given up all

unequal treaty rights and privileges, such as extra-territoriality, some privileges
were still maintained informally by the Nationalist government. Foreigners, for
example, were protected by their foreign legations.

The racial discriminatory

sign: “Chinese and dogs cannot enter!” had not yet been removed in front of many
foreign-owned establishments. Therefore, the harassment of foreign officials and
nationals was designed to get rid o f these informal foreign privileges and foreign
influence in general, and to end China’s national humiliation. The United States,
however, wanted to maintain its influence, trading rights and privileges that were
given by the KMT.

Obviously, from the Communists’ perspective, Stuart’s

demand of accepting “international practice with respect to treaties” was
unacceptable because if the CCP accepted all treaties signed by previous Chinese
governments, the new government would not only be responsible for all
international debts, but also be obliged to tolerate the continuation o f western
imperial influence.

This fundamental conflict became the major barrier to

improving relations between the two governments.
Unexpectedly, on May 31, 1949, Chou En-lai sent a message to Consul
General O. Edmund Clubb in Beijing, saying that the leadership o f the CCP was
seriously divided between Liu Shao-ch’i (pro-Moscow faction) and Chou En-lai
(liberal faction). The liberal faction supported early establishment of relations
with the Western powers in the hope that American economic aid would help
China to get out of economic hardship. The pro-Moscow faction, nevertheless,
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stressed the support for the Soviet side. The final direction would be based on
which faction won.

When the message came to the eyes of the American

officials, how did they interpret it? Clearly, this letter supported the argument
that China needed American aid, and therefore the United States used this need to
push the CCP to accept the American demands. This letter became one of the
major arguments for the policy o f non-recognition.
Consul General Clubb believed that this letter was a move “of high
Communist policy” with the approval o f the Soviet Union. He explained that
China needed to deal with the United States in order to avoid a “calamitous
economic collapse.” Thus, this message represented the Communists’ hope to
“continue [a] diet o f Soviet political bread but eke out [a] diet with American
economic cake.”

9 1

Even though Clubb had such feelings, he still encouraged the

United States government to give Chou a reply. Chou, however, refused to make
any arrangement to get the reply. According to Clubb’s analysis, Chou’s message
“was designed [to] serve [the] political purpose o f causing USA [to] view
Communist leaders more sympathetically, and perhaps letting sympathy affect US
attitude re[sic] trade or direct aid, but did not constitute sincere expression of
Communist views.”22

Thus,

even though the

United

States

reacted

sympathetically, Chou’s letter did not bring any significant reduction of SinoAmerican tension. To a great extent, the responsibility o f losing this chance was

21 U.S. State Department, Foreign Relations of the United States. 1949. Vol.VIII, pp.363-364.
22 Ibid., pp.398-399.
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on the Chinese side instead of the American because it was the Chinese
communists who did not follow up, not the Americans.
During the same period of time, the capture of Shanghai by the
Communists exacerbated Sino-American tensions.

Labor unrest and hostile

actions by the CCP further worsened the situation. The beating and detention of
American Vice Consul William Olive because o f a minor traffic charge was the
most notorious example. Olive was arrested “while en[sic] route [to a] filling
station in jeep, apparently for alleged obstruction [of] Communists in parade.”
Since not many Chinese people could afford riding a jeep, those who rode in
foreign vehicles were usually identified as the privileged class, such as
government officials, merchants, or foreigners. Olive’s arrest revealed people’s
resentment toward foreigners’ luxurious lifestyle in China because most o f the
Chinese people believed that the destitute condition in China was caused by
foreign oppression and encroachment. There were also the Callender case (June
1, 1949) and the Shanghai Tramway Company incident (June 23, 1949). In these
two cases, American employees were arrested by the Communists on charges of
mistreating their Chinese staff.24 Consul General John M. Cabot in Shanghai
summarized the pattern of these incidents as follows:
Storm o f protests at bad conduct o f foreigner sent to newspapers by fellow
employees o f plaintiff, by peaceful onlookers, and by people in other occupations
however unrelated to original plaintiff, accompanied by many readings o f moral
that days o f imperialism and special privilege in Shanghai are over. Foreign
inevitably found to be wrong, forced to recompense Chinese for damages
23 Ibid., pp. 1199-1200.
24 Ibid., p. 1185.
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suffered, and to make public apology promising never to repeat offense. Such
chastisement and accompanying publicity in keeping with Chinese ideas o f “face”
seem designed to humiliate rather than to punish severely.

This hostile atmosphere discouraged many American businessmen. There was an
increasing desire to pack up and leave Shanghai “rather than submit to
humiliations and insecurities of present situation,” according to Consul Cabot’s
telegram to Washington on June 26, 1949 26 Even Ambassador Stuart and Consul
Cabot’s attitudes were negative.

They recommended Washington close “all

Consular offices in China with possible exception Nanking and Peiping.”27 The
feeling o f disillusionment was stronger among Americans than the British who
also suffered similar hardship and humiliation. While the British were trying to
seek other ways to stay, such as extending recognition or negotiation, most of the
Americans in China were packing up to leave. By leaving China, Americans
demonstrated

their

discontent

and

disillusionment

toward

the

Chinese

communists.
Although the situation in June 1949 was unpleasant, the CCP presented a
chance o f reconciliation.

On June 28, 1949, Ambassador Stuart received an

invitation from Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai to visit Beijing. This invitation
was the result o f Philip Fugh’s suggestion that Stuart visit his old university,
Yenching University, on June 24. It is important to note that Fugh’s suggestion
was without Stuart’s approval. Stuart summarized both the possible advantages

25 Ibid., p. 1185.
26 Ibid., p. 1185.
27 Ibid., p. 1308.
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and disadvantages o f a visit in his report to Washington.

The principal

advantages would be the presentation o f American views directly to the Chinese
leaders and, at the same time, acquisition of the “most authoritative information
regarding CCP intentions.” His visit would strengthen the liberal faction within
the CCP, and it would be an indication of America’s “open-minded attitude
towards changing political trends in China and probably would have beneficial
effect on future Sino-American relations.”

For the disadvantages, Stuart

stressed that his visit would break the “united front” of the diplomatic corps in
Nanjing. It would also enhance the CCP’s national and international prestige, and
Mao would perceive that the United States would recognize a Communist China
'JQ

if the Nationalist Government lost the war.

Because of these disadvantages, the

State Department ordered Stuart not to visit Beijing.

This decision was

significant for the prospect o f Sino-American reconciliation because instead of
moving forwards, Washington chose to give up this chance.
There was another major factor strengthening Washington’s decision not
to send Ambassador Stuart to Beijing. On June 30, even before Stuart replied to
M ao’s invitation, Mao published his “leaning to one side” policy in the essay “On
People’s Democratic Dictatorship.” Mao said:
Internationally we belong to the side o f the anti-imperialist front headed by the
Soviet Union, and so we can turn only to this side for genuine and friendly help,
not to the side o f the imperialist front.30
28 Ibid., pp.766-767.
29 Ibid., pp.766-767.
30 Mao Tse-tung, “On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship,” Selected Words of Mao Tse-tung. Vol.III,
(Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1975), pp.417.
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This stress on the importance of leaning to the Soviet side reversed the previous
position of acquiring economic aid from the United States because Mao now
believed it would be foolish to think of getting American or British aid.31 Mao’s
stance clearly contradicted Chou’s letter and Huang Hua’s statement to Fugh of
June 8 that China would need American aid. Mao rejected Chou’s liberal policy
and ended speculation that economic necessity would force the Communists into
some sort of accommodation with the West.

It also explained why the

Communists refused to receive an American reply to Chou’s letter.
The whole course of development, from Chou’s letter to the “leaning to
one side” policy, represented the struggle over and the conclusion of Mao’s policy
directive. The Communist leaders, at first, were uncertain of any policy move
because each move would determine the destiny o f the party. Since Mao never
left China throughout his life, his conception o f the western world was based
either on second-hand sources or on his own imagination.

The Communist

leaders around him, except a few who had been to Europe like Chou En-lai and
Deng Xiao-ping, were mostly educated in the Soviet Union.

Although these

Soviet trained leaders, such as Lin Biao and Liu Shao-ch’i, might not have had the
strongest influence on Mao, their voice was definitely louder. It is important to
note that M ao’s primary concern was the survival of the CCP, not the economic
recovery o f China. Therefore, he would do everything in order to have the party

31 Ibid., pp.415-417.
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survive and consolidate its control in China. As Mao pointed out in his paper,
China could only survive by leaning either to the imperialist side or to the Soviet
side.

Since Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek had failed by leaning to the

imperialists, Mao decided to lean to the Soviet Union. Mao had several reasons:
first, a common ideological belief; second, signs of Soviet friendship (for
example, the Soviet Union gave the CCP the weapons left by the Japanese in
1945); and third, the uncertainty of the American support (because the United
States still supported the KMT). Thus, it would be safer for the CCP to lean to
the Soviet side. In the light of this, the “leaning to one side” policy served two
major political purposes: unify the party and gain Soviet support. It was the first
step to a military alliance (the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Alliance with the Soviet
Union). Mao need to gain Stalin’s trust because Mao rose to power without
Soviet support. He broke with the Soviet faction within the CCP in the 1930s
before the Long March. Thus, Stalin did not trust Mao. In order to gain Stalin’s
trust, Mao had to do some “lip service.” He chose to deliver it before receiving
Stuart’s reply to the invitation because he did not want to alienate the Soviet
Union, regardless of whether Stuart came to Beijing or not. The “leaning to one
side” policy was indeed a calculated political move.
The contradictory ideas and behaviors of the CCP indeed made it difficult
for the United States government to react. Taking the literal meaning o f Mao’s
publication, policy makers in Washington were confused. By refusing to send
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Ambassador Stuart to visit Beijing, Washington gave up its chance to have a
direct communication with Mao and Chou. Most importantly, it worsened the
already weak Sino-American relations.

Besides, Washington’s decision

demonstrated the unwillingness of the United States government to recognize a
regime that had not yet formed a national government, and at the same time
reflected its unwillingness to contribute to the prestige of Communist leaders who
were hostile to the United States.32 Mao’s “leaning to one side” declaration also
strengthened Truman’s Non-Recognition policy because Americans tended to
over-simplify these complicated issues by assuming the CCP had determined to
follow the Soviet Union. Mao’s essay, together with the Mukden incident,
impressed many Americans that the CCP was really Russia’s puppet.

The

American public became less willing to accept what it viewed as a puppet
government in China, hardening the policy of Non-Recognition.
When Ambassador Stuart refused to visit Beijing,

Communist actions

against Americans intensified. On July 15, 1949, the Foreign Affairs Bureau in
Shanghai ordered the director o f the U.S. Information Service (USIS) to stop all
its operations, including the Consulate General’s movies, concerts, library, news,
*

and publicity.
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The consulate general in Beijing received similar orders

because, it was reasoned, “the People’s Government [had] no diplomatic or
consular relations with USA.”34 Even when Ambassador Stuart wanted to depart

32 Martin, Divided Counsel, p. 48.
33 U.S. State Department, Foreign Relations o f the United States. 1949. Vol. VIII, p. 1232.
34 Ibid., p. 1095.
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China for the United States on consultation, the CCP raised many barriers to
prevent him from leaving. The Communists, at the same time, kept on attacking
American officials in China. Stuart believed that his departure problems related to
his refusal to visit Beijing. According to what Chen Ying, a Chinese official, had
told Fugh, “if Stuart had gone to [Beijing] all these little questions would have
been easily settled.”

However, it is important to note that in July 1949, the

KMT launched a blockade against the Communists. There might be a possibility
that the CCP wanted to keep Ambassador Stuart in Nanjing in order to gain
American co-operation to break the blockade. The Communists’ hostile attitude
was also caused by the release o f the China White Paper in August 1949 by the
U.S. State Department which asserted that “the Communist regime serves not
[Chinese] interests, but these o f Soviet Russia.”36
Facing the CCP’s hostile and “unreasonable” actions, Lewis Clark,
Minister-Counselor, recommended that all U.S. official personnel should be
withdrawn because “it [would] be impossible to ‘do business’ with Communists
on any other than intolerant terms.”

In fact, once Ambassador Stuart had left

China on August 2, 1949, he never returned. On August 12, Washington decided
to close the consulate general in Guangzhou before the city fell to the
Communists. By mid-August, the United States government had even decided to

35 Ibid., p.785.
36 U. S. Department of State, United States Relations with China. (Washington, D.C.: Department of State,
1949), p.xvii.
37 U.S. Department o f State, Foreign Relations o f the United States. 1949. Vol. VIII, pp. 1308-1309.
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close consular offices in six cities in China, including Tihwa, Chungking, and
Kunming.38
The departure of Ambassador Stuart and the closing o f consular offices
were a significant stage in the development of United States policy toward
Communist China.

Instead o f finding a way to stay, the United States and

American citizens chose to retreat. Once Stuart had returned to the United States,
it became even more difficult for Washington to have direct communication with
the CCP. Each side, as a result, further hardened its own thinking towards the
other. These decisions had significant impact on the British. First, the United
States broke the common Anglo-American policy of keeping consulates in
Communist territory. Second, the American departure increased the burden on
British consular representatives in China, as the United States government asked
the British to protect its interests and people in the areas where American
consular offices had been closed.39

Despite Washington’s change in policy,

London was still determined to keep its foot in the door of China.40
By the end o f June, when the KMT launched a blockade to close those
ports no longer under its control, Shanghai was the major target. A blockade was
regarded as illegal unless it proved its effectiveness. It is important to note that
foreign powers as well as the CCP could break the blockade if they had enough
military power.

Since Britain had a bigger population in Shanghai and the

38 Martin, Divided Counsel, p. 52.
39 Ibid., p.52.
40 Ibid., p.54.
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success o f its “stay out” policy depended on the Communists’ need for foreign
trade and technical assistance, London wanted to break the blockade as soon as
possible. Thus, they asked for American co-operation in delivering supplies to
Shanghai, but Washington rejected the British request, reasoning that they did not
want to save the Communists. Similar to its policy of closing consular offices in
China, the United States only thought o f how to get Americans out o f Shanghai
instead o f keeping Shanghai open.
The United States attitude strengthened Chinese anti-American feeling.
Communists at that time made use of the blockade to further attack and humiliate
American residents in China. In the words of historian Edwin W. Martin, “the
blockade provided opportunities for Communist political exploitation at the
expense of the United States; it enhanced the Communists’ efforts to divide the
Western powers.”41 According to a report by the U.S. Consul General Walter P.
McConaughy in Shanghai, the Communists treated the British and the American
residents in Shanghai differently: the Communists were “up to their old device of
playing one group o f foreigners against another” in order to break the united front
among various western communities.42 The division between the western powers,
nevertheless, might not have been the sole responsibility o f the Communists.
Rather, fundamental differences between Washington and London split the two
countries in their policy toward China.

41 Ibid., p.61.
42 U.S. State Department, Foreign Relations of the United States. 1949. Vol. VIII, p. 1292.
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When the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was established on October
1, 1949, Washington and London disagreed on whether to recognize the new
regime.

Washington argued that the United States would recognize the PRC

given:
(1) that it controlled the country that it clainied to control; (2) that it recognized
its international obligations; and (3) that it ruled with the acquiescence o f the
people who were ruled.43

These three principles seemed reasonable, but from Beijing’s point of view, the
second principle was not acceptable. One o f the basic tenets of the CCP was anti
imperialism. The PRC demanded an end to all unequal treaties signed between
the European powers and the Qing government, and they wanted to expel all
imperialists from China. For Beijing to recognize its international obligations
required that the new government accepted all those international treaties signed
by previous governments. As a result, the new regime would be responsible for
all national debts, a huge economic burden for the new regime and its people.
Also, receiving recognition was no guarantee o f receiving sufficient economic
help from the United States, especially when the policies o f Communism were
fundamentally opposed by Capitalist powers.
Most importantly, if the PRC moved closer to the United States, it would
inevitably alienate the Soviet Union, jeopardizing its survival. Unlike leaning to
the Soviet Union, there was no guarantee of success if the PRC moved closer to

43 Quoted in the statement by Philip C. Jessup, “U.S. Policy Toward China, 1949-50,” Department of State
Bulletin. Vol.XXV, No.642 (October 15, 1951), p.605.
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the West. The United States had done nothing to ensure that it would not move
against the CCP.

What the Chinese Communists surely knew was that most

Americans, including their policy makers, did not like Communism. The CCP
was smart enough to see the potential danger of moving closer to the West. If
Beijing had done so, accepting all conditions, the regime would have in turn
alienated the Soviet Union, weakened its own revolutionary principles, and, fallen
into the same trap as the Nationalist Government.

At the same time, since the

KMT had still not been defeated, if the CCP had yielded the first time, it might
have had to yield continuously to a possible demand of forming a coalition.
Yielding to the West would never end until the day the CCP was no longer the
CCP. This was what Mao wanted to avoid. Although Mao chose to lean to the
Soviet Union, the CCP always maintained its independence.

It supported the

Soviet Union, but was definitely not controlled by it. In fact, the CCP refusal to
make an initiative to move closer to the West did not mean that the West should
not move closer to it. George Kennan carefully examined the situation and came
up with the conclusion that the United States should recognize the CCP and
normalize Sino-American relations immediately. In his address to Acheson and
officials, Kennan argued that “the greatest single external threat to the complete
Stalinization o f China is that the U.S. should establish normal relations with the
Chinese Communists and once more bring its influence to bear in that country,
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even if on a more restricted basis.”44 Kennan believed that recognizing the
Beijing government was in the best interest of the United States and of China.45
The British shared the same idea with Kennan.

Although Britain had

similar principles as the United States concerning recognition, it was willing to
sacrifice those principles in order to stay in China.

On November 1, 1949,

London consulted Washington on favoring early recognition.

In a personal

message to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, British Foreign Minister Ernest
Bevin pointed out that there were four factors that the British considered:
(1) to protect British interests in China, (2) to strength the position in Hong Kong,
Malaya and Singapore where there were vast Chinese communities, (3) to reduce
troubles caused by non-recognition, and most importantly, (4) to [exploit the]
potential rifts between Beijing and Moscow.46

Bevin defined British recognition as an acknowledgment of “the inescapable fact
that the Chinese Communist Government [was] in effective control in China,”
and having such control did not imply getting Britain’s approval47 London hoped
that through early recognition, Britain could keep a “foot in the door.”48 Bevin
argued that if the United States continued to condemn the Chinese Communists
publicly, maintain diplomatic ties with the KMT, support the blockade of
Shanghai, and object to the entry o f the PRC to the United Nations, it would

44 Quoted in Wilson D. Miscamble, George F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy. 19471950. (Princeton, New Jersey. Princeton University Press, 1991), p.240.
45 Ibid., p.240.
46 U.S. State Department, Foreign Relations o f the United States. 1949. Vol.IX, p.225.
47 Ibid., pp.225-226.
48 Ibid., p.226.
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possibly alienate China from the West permanently.49 “The disadvantages of
nonrecognition were so great as to outweigh any possible advantages to be
obtained from securing Chinese Communist assurance o f respect for international
obligations,” in the words of Counselor Hubert Graves o f the British embassy.50
Apparently, London was concerned about its economic interests.

The

British indeed had huge investments in China, and their trade with China was
extensive. Compared to Britain, the United States did not have such substantial
economic interests in China.51 It cannot be denied that Britain did not want to
lose its trade with China, but mere recognition could hardly achieve this aim if
the Beijing government was still hostile to the West.

It was not difficult to

predict that foreign trade would eventually die out because Communists usually
discouraged free trade. Therefore, the British policy o f recognition was more
political than economic.

The British believed that: first, if the PRC gained

western support, it would increase its sense of security and reduce its reliance on
the Soviet Union; second, Britain could cultivate the fundamental conflicts
between China and Russia such as border and sovereignty disputes, in order to
split the two big communist powers; third, if the PRC really came closer to the
West, it would induce Russia’s jealousy, and China might become a type o f Asian

49 David McLean, “American Nationalism, the China Myth, and the Truman Doctrine: The Question of
Accommodation with Peking, 1949-1950,” Diplomatic History. Vol. 10, No. 1 (Winter, 1986), p.28.
50 Quoted by Martin, Divided Counsels, p.87.
51 McLean, “American Nationalism, the China Myth, and the Truman Doctrine: The Question of
Accommodation with Peking, 1949-1950,” p.29.
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Yugoslavia, a communist state in Eastern Europe that broke with the Soviet
Union in 1948.
The United States, nevertheless, did not totally agree with the British
calculation. It was true that Washington wanted to see China develop into an
Asian Yugoslavia, but Americans did not believe that recognition could help.
According to historian David McLean, “assumptions about the monolithic
character of communism were common in the non-Communist world in 1949, but
in the case o f China no Western state clung to these notions as tenaciously as did
the United States.”52 America’s own myth about its special relationship with
China explained the reason behind it. Since Americans believed that the Chinese
people were on the side o f the United States because of their traditional
friendship, they believed that the Russians or the Communists would not be
accepted by the Chinese people. Thus, the United States officials asserted that
the CCP could only rule the country with the direct support of the Soviet
Government.

Since the CCP needed the help o f the Soviet Union in order to

maintain its rule, it would be impossible for other powers to drive a wedge
between them. The only hope was that the Chinese people might overthrow the
CCP themselves.

In this case, granting recognition would only strengthen the

CCP and weakened the anti-Communist factions in China. Therefore, the United

52 Ibid., p.35.
53 Ibid., p.35.
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States did not agree with the action of the British and kept refusing to recognize
the PRC.
The problem o f this interpretation was that the CCP did not really rely on
Soviet support to gain control in China.

Indeed, the CCP had strong public

support. American Chinese expert John Paton Davies, Jr. had pointed this out
and argued that the CCP was not a puppet of the Soviet Union. In fact, the only
fear that the CCP had was that the United States might support the Nationalists to
fight back. If the United States kept recognizing the KMT and supporting the
KMT’s blockade against the mainland, there were good reasons o f the CCP not to
trust the United States.
Over Washington’s strenuous objections, London decided to extend its
recognition on January 6, 1950 with the support of India, Pakistan, Ceylon, and
New Zealand. When London recognized the PRC, the united front among the
western powers was broken.

The controversy over whether the United States

should recognize the PRC continued inside the United States until August 1950.

CHAPTER m
INTERNAL PRESSURES AND EXTERNAL CHALLENGES

Although the United States did not agree with the British decision to
recognize the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the question remained: How did
British recognition influence the Truman administration’s China policy?

Did

decision makers in the United States have any intentions to accommodate the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) or did internal pressures discourage the United
States recognition of the PRC during the Truman administration?
There are three different interpretations explaining the attitude o f policy
makers in the United States. According to historians Warren I. Cohen and John
Lewis Gaddis, Secretary of State Dean Acheson did try to have an
accommodation with Beijing before the PRC entered the Korean War.
Accommodation here did not mean recognition, but it was the first step toward
recognition. Cohen stresses that Acheson was restrained by political pressures
from Congress, public opinion, colleagues within the administration, and even the
President.

Gaddis, on the other hand, believes that President Truman was

Acheson’s partner in searching for a kind of accommodation with the Chinese
Communists.1

1 Warren Cohen, “Acheson, His advisers, and China, 1949-50,” Uncertain Years: Chinese American
Relations. 1947-1950. Ed. by Dorothy Borg and Waldo Heinrichs. (New York: Columbia University Press,
1980), pp. 13-52; John Lewis Gaddis, “Was the Truman Doctrine a Real Turning Point?” Foreign Affairs.
Vol. VII (January 1974), pp.390-397.
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A second interpretation is held by Lanxin Xiang, an Assistant Professor of
Political Science at Clemson University, in South Carolina. He totally disagrees
with the first interpretation and argues that “Acheson was never committed to
pursuing a ‘Chinese Tito policy,’” but “along with President Truman, was
consistent in taking a tough line with Peking.”2

He points out that Acheson

insisted “on China’s honoring ‘international obligation,’ including most o f the
•2

Sino-U.S. bilateral treaties, as pre-conditions for recognition.” He further argues
that the Anglo-American controversy over the issue of recognition showed that
Acheson’s China policy was consistently hostile and irritable.4
A third interpretation is presented by historian David McLean who
believes

that

Acheson

started

to

consider

the

possibility

of

seeking

accommodation in his policy making only at the end o f October 1949, but the
consideration did not last as long as Cohen and Gaddis claimed. He argues that
“the State Department, and American officialdom generally, showed a far greater
reluctance to entertain the idea o f coming to terms with the Chinese Communists
than did other Western governments, and that a policy of antagonism toward the
CCP was given greater consideration in the United States than in other Western
states.”5 Instead of arguing that internal political forces hindered the policy of

2 Lanxin Xiang, “The Recognition Controversy: Anglo-American Relations in China, 1949,” Journal of
Contemporary History. Vol.XXVII, No.2 (1992), p.319.
3 Ibid., p.319.
4 Ibid., p.320.
5 David McLean, “American Nationalism, the China Myth, and the Truman Doctrine: The Question of
Accommodation with Peking, 1949-50,” Diplomatic History. Vol.X, N o.l, (Winter 1986), p.30.
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accommodation, McLean points to the influence of the strong China myth upon
Acheson and other American officials.6
Policy makers, in fact, are not machines, and their minds will change
according to the way they interpret external challenges.

Acheson or other

officials might change their feelings, interpretations, or policy decisions in
different periods. Indeed, some factors were totally beyond their control or even
their imagination.

As the Secretary of State, Acheson could hardly make a

difference unless he had the strong support either o f the administration or the
public. In this sense, the democratic system in America had an important role in
shaping the Non-Recognition policy. The China myth would not have been so
influential upon policy makers if it had not had popular support. The power of
the China myth was revealed through the attitude of public opinion, the success of
the China Lobby, a powerful lobbying group formed by the Nationalist
Government with the support of some American pro-Chiang and antiCommunists groups or individuals, and the rise of McCarthyism, a paranoid and
fanatical movement to hunt-down suspected Communists spies within the United
States government.

To a great extent, the China myth distorted the way

Americans interpreted changes in China.

Accordingly, the China myth and

internal

be

6 Ibid., pp.30-3 5.

political pressures

should not

separated

in

analyzing

the
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administration’s reactions to the rise of Communist China and the formation of
the Non-Recognition policy.
The first question to be clarify is: Did the Truman administration ever
have an idea of accommodation with the PRC? The answer is “Yes,” but I agree
with McLean that the idea lasted only for a very short period of time, from
November 1949 to January 1950. On December 23, the State Department issued
a confidential document entitled “Policy Information Paper -- Formosa.” The
document claimed that the loss o f Formosa (Taiwan) was “widely anticipated”
and that “the manner in which civil and military conditions there have
deteriorated under the Nationalists add weight to the expectation.”7 The State
Department was pessimistic about the future o f Taiwan, and thus, searching for
accommodation with the CCP was necessary if the United States wanted to
continue to have relations with China.
On the same day, however, the Joint Chief Staff (JCS)

sent a

memorandum to Secretary o f Defense Louis Johnson, saying that “a modest, welldirected, and closely-supervised program o f military aid to the anti-Communist
government in Taiwan would be in the security interest o f the United States.”8
The JCS suggested that the United States government should protect Taiwan from
communist attack. Acheson and the State Department were strongly against this
suggestion. In fact, President Truman did not want to continue supporting the

7 U.S. State Department, Foreign Relations o f the United States. 1949. Vol.IX, p.460.
8 Ibid., p.463.
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Nationalist regime in Taiwan.

The administration revealed its lack of faith

towards the KMT government in the China White Paper (1949).

The paper

described the KMT as a corrupt and un-democratic regime that was doomed to
failure. Eventually, Truman made his decision and openly announced, on January
5, 1950, that the United States government would “not provide military aid or
advice to Chinese forces on Formosa,” nor did it “have any intention of utilizing
its armed forces to interfere in the present situation” there.9 It was the first time
since the beginning of the Chinese Civil War that the United States government
announced a “hands-off’ policy over China. Truman sent a clear signal to the
PRC that the United States would not interfere if it attacked Taiwan. In fact,
from this point onward, the United States government did not allow items such as
bombers and heavy tanks to be transported to Taiwan with American funding
until the Korean War broke out in June, 1950.10 Truman’s statement indeed is
quite significant in understanding the gradual change o f attitude within the
administration. Ideologically, the administration was still anti-Communist, but
practically, Washington was trying to open more policy options for the United
States in dealing with the Communist regime in China because it wanted to
protect American commercial interests in China. In this sense, from November
1949 to January 1950, the administration was moving toward a form of

9 U.S. State Department, Department o f State Bulletin. Vol.XXH, N o.550, (January 16, 1950), p.79.
10 U.S. State Department, Foreign Relations o f the United States. 1950. Vol.XI, p.256-257.
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accommodation. It is important to note that during that period of time, the State
Department had a relatively free hand in making its China policy.
Nevertheless, Truman’s announcement did not bring any positive reaction
from the PRC. Unexpectedly, on January 6, 1950, the same day on which the
British government recognized the PRC, the Beijing Municipal Military Control
Commission made a move that squelched any hope of accommodation.

It

announced that the Central People’s Government would requisition land on which
military barracks had been built under the unequal treaty system.11 Unfortunately,
the American consular compound in Beijing was included. From the American
perspective, nevertheless, since the former American military barracks had
already been removed and turned into consular office, the PRC had no reason to
seize the American consular compound. The Consul General O. Edmund Clubb
at Beijing tried to contact Chou En-lai to clarify the American position many
times, but did not receive a single response. On January 14, according to the
report by the State Department, “the premises of the Consulate General were
invaded by the police and four civilian officials.”12
The immediate effect o f this proclamation was the requisitioning of the
American property in Beijing, but most importantly, the incident was closely
related to the question o f respect for treaties entered into by previous Chinese
governments. The State Department condemned the CCP by saying that:

11 New China News Agency, Daily News Release. No.261 (January 19, 1950), p.77.
12 U.S. Department o f State, “Communists Take U.S. Property in China,” Department of State Bulletin.
Vol.XXH, No.551 (January 23, 1950), p. 119.
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The United States Government takes an extremely serious view o f this situation,
which constitutes a flagrant violation o f our treaty rights and o f the most
elementary standards o f international usage and conduct. 13

Chinese action caused great resentment within the United States because
Americans were extremely sensitive about property rights. They were willing to
wage war against those who disregarded their property rights. As a result, the
seizure o f American property by the Communists led to the strict decision to
withdraw all American officials from the PRC.
However, why did the Chinese Communists carry out this policy?
According to Consul General Clubb, Communists might have considered three
possible American responses to their actions:
(1) speeding up American recognition, (2) withdrawal Consulate to main
compound with Americans humiliated and prestige reduced, while Communists
could claim “victory over imperialists,” (3) at worst, complete withdrawal o f
Consulate from Peiping. It seems improbable Communists anticipated present
consequences, that is, complete withdrawal from China.14

The first option was possible because at the beginning the British consular
compound was included, but after Britain recognized the Beijing regime, its
consular compound was exempted. The second option was reasonable because it
fit the long established goal o f the CCP in driving all foreign imperialists out of
China.

The third option, however, is more difficult to explain.

If the

Communists did not anticipate the serious effects o f the seizure o f U.S. property,
why did they still consider that the withdrawal of the United States Consulate
would be good for them? According to an American officials’ analysis, it was not

13 Ibid., p. 119.
14 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations o f the United State. 1950. Vol. VI, p.287.
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just the Chinese Communists who made the decision, there was something more.
Clubb felt that the Soviet Union or pro-Russian Chinese Communists might have
desired an American withdrawal from China in order to isolate China from the
West.15 Clubb5s explanation showed that some American officials tended to
relate every single hostile action of the Chinese government to a Soviet
conspiracy.
The seizure o f American property had great impact on American public
opinion. The anti-Communist feeling among the American public was intensified.
A British professor, R. Ovendale, observed that once the American diplomatic
representatives had left China, it was unlikely for them to return unless American
public opinion improved. Public opinion, however, continued to deteriorate.16
Through the increasing influence of the China Lobby and the rise of
McCarthyism, we can see the general feeling of disillusionment among the
American public.
Public opinion had long been an important political force in the United
States. In his remarks concerning the administration’s Taiwan policy, on January
16,1950, Secretary Acheson said:
I want to [remind] you that I have said very often in these meetings that the
foreign policy o f the United States is determined not merely by what the State
Department says, or not even by what the President says, and not even by what
the Congress says, but reflects the sum total o f the activities, thoughts, and speech
o f the American people.17

15 Ibid., p.287.
16 R. Ovendale, “Britain, the United States, and the Recognition of Communist China,” The Historical
Journal. Vol.XXVI,No.l (1983), p.153.
17 U.S. Department of State, Department o f State Bulletin. Vol.XXH, No.550, (January 16, 1950), p.79.
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Making these remarks right after the seizure of American property in Beijing had
a special implication. Acheson wanted to tell the Communists that any decision
made by the United States government was based on public opinion.

In this

sense, the decision to withdraw all the American officials was not a decision of
the State Department but a general request by the American people in responding
to what the PRC had just done.

Therefore, if the PRC wanted to improve

relations with the United States, it would have to do something to settle the public
discontent.
Indeed, it is hard to determine whether the Truman administration was
directed by public opinion because public response over the issue o f recognition
was so close to the administration’s criticism of the PRC. According to the China
White Paper, an official publication on the Chinese Civil War, the administration
condemned the CCP because it submitted itself to the Soviet domination. In a
letter to President Truman, which was included in the White Paper, Secretary
Acheson said:
The Communist leaders have forsworn their Chinese heritage and have publicly
announced their subservience to a foreign power, Russia, which during the last 50
years, under czars and Communists alike, has been most assiduous in its efforts to
extend its control in the Far East.18

Acheson’s attitude was widely accepted by the public. According to a Gallup Poll
in November 1949, among the 76 percent of those who heard about the

18 Secretary o f State Dean Acheson to President Harry S. Truman, July 30, 1949, Letter o f Transmittal, in
White Paper, p.xvi, quoted by Nancy Bemkopf Tucker, Patterns in the Dust: Chinese American Relations
and the Recognition Controversy 1949-1950. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), p.28.
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Communist regime in China, 42 percent did not favor recognition.19 Another
survey in May 1950 showed that the majority of people who had a clear concept
about the nature o f regime in China, favored the Non-Recognition policy.20 In
June 1950, a survey asking whether Communist China should be seated in the
United Nations showed that 58 percent disapproved. A majority of the population
(over 80 percent) believed that the Chinese entered the Korean War at the order
o f the Soviet Union.21 These surveys showed that the public favored the policy of
non-recognition.

They distrusted the PRC because they thought of it as the

puppet of the Soviet Union. In this case, what the American public believed and
what the United States government had emphasized were similar.

The

administration should bear the responsibility of deepening the anti-Communist
sentiment in the United States that eventually gave rise to the anti-Communist
hysteria of the period.
From the seizure of the Beijing consular compound to the beginning of the
Korean War, there was intense political pressure on the State Department. The
activities o f the China Lobby intensified when Truman announced his “handso ff7 policy. The pro-Chiang and anti-Communist China Lobby formed originally
by the Nationalist Government to secure American political and economic aid
was led by Chiang Kai-shek’s wife. It included publishers, such as Roy Howard,
William Randolph Hearst, and Henry Luce, and disgruntled military leaders, such

19 The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion. 1935-1970. V ol.l, (New York: Random House, 1972), pp.880-881.
20 Ibid., p.915.
21 Ibid., p.955.
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as General Claire Lee Chennault, General Douglas MacArthur, and Major
General Patrick J. Hurley.22

The lobby worked through many variegated

organizations and publications, such as the Universal Trading Corporation, the
American China Policy Association,

the Committee to Defend America by

Aiding Anti-Communist China, The China Monthly, and Plain Talk. In the words
o f historian Charles R. Kitts, the China Lobby “had money, public relations firms,
and a sophisticated propaganda machine at its disposal.”23
The influence o f the China Lobby was further strengthened by the China
Bloc in the Congress. The China Bloc was an informal organization o f highly
conservative Republican and Democratic Congressmen. Republicans such as
Senator Owen Brewster of Maine, Senator Alexander Smith o f New Jersey,
Senator Homer Ferguson o f Michigan, Representative O. K. Armstrong of
Missouri, Representative Lawrence Smith of Wisconsin, and Representative John
Vorys of Ohio, as well as Democratic Senators such as Pat McCarran of Nevada
and James Eastland o f Mississippi, were among the China Bloc’s congressional
members.

They constantly pressed for greater support for the Nationalist

Government and reduced debate to hard-line dichotomies o f “red” and “white,”
pro- or anti-Communist.

They worked hard to overturn the Truman

administration’s hands-off policy.

When Beijing seized American consular

22 Ross Y. Koen, The China Lobby in American Politics. (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1974),
p.212.
23 Charles R. Kitts, The United States Odvssey in China. 1784-1990. (New York: University Press of
America, 1991), p.203.
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premises and property, Republican Senator William F. Knowland of California,
who was a member o f the China Bloc, even demanded Acheson’s resignation.24
The China Bloc, together with the China Lobby, became two of the most
significant domestic political pressures upon the administration not to recognize
the PRC.
The power o f the China Bloc and China Lobby was strengthened when
Republican Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin delivered his well-known
speech before the Women’s Republican Club at Wheeling, West Virginia, on
February 9, 1950. McCarthy said:
I have here in my hand a list o f 205 ... a list o f names that were made known to
the Secretary o f State as being members o f the Communist Party and who
nevertheless are still working and shaping policy in the State Department.25

He made use o f the anti-Communist hysteria to charge that the administration,
especially the State Department, was controlled by Communists and Communist
sympathizers who intentionally lost China.

According to historian Nancy

Bemkopf Tucker, although McCarthy was ignorant of Chinese affairs and had no
special interest in the East, he “used the issue to further his political career.”
The China Lobby and the China Bloc, in order to strengthen their argument of
“Administration betrayals of Chiang Kai-shek,” supplied McCarthy with
information about any possible target o f attack within the administration.27 As a

24 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: Mv Year in the State Department. (New York: W.W. Norton and
Company, Inc., 1969), p.354.
25 Quoted by John D. Peurifoy, “Review of Charges That Communists Infiltrate Department,” Department
o f State Bulletin. Vol.XXH, No.567, (May 15, 1950), p.752.
26 Tucker, Patterns in the Dust, p. 167.
27 Ibid., p. 176.

53
result, the China Lobby, the China Bloc, and McCarthy formed a powerful
internal political pressure group to challenge the administration.
Working in concert, the China Lobby, the China Bloc, and Senator
McCarthy used every possible rationale to discredit the administration.

From

McCarthy’s Wheeling speech onward, Acheson together with his China
specialists were all under heavy attack for being “soft” on communists.
Defamatory attacks also focused on scholars, journalists, and even military
officers. The most famous case was the conviction o f Alger Hiss, a former State
Department officer. Because Hiss had attended the Yalta Conference with
President Franklin D. Roosevelt during the World War II, his conviction for
peijury pushed Communist hysteria to a new height. After Hiss’s conviction, all
officers and advisers in the State Department became suspects.

According to

Acheson’s book Present at the Creation, the President’s political enemy,
Republican Senator William E. Jenner o f Indiana, condemned the administration:
It is tragic, Mr. President, that General Marshall is not enough o f a patriot to tell
the American people the truth o f what has happened, and the terrifying story o f
what lies in store for us, instead o f joining hands once more with this criminal
crowd o f traitors and Communist appeasers who, under the continuing influence
and direction o f Mr. Truman and Mr. Acheson, are still selling America down the
river.28

These attacks continued until Truman left office in January 1953.

Secretary

Acheson described this period as “a time o f work and troubles, a somber time.”29

28 Quoted by Acheson, Present at the Creation, p.365.
29 Ibid., p.354.
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Because o f McCarthy’s persecution, many remarkable government
advisers, including Owen Lawrence Rosinger, John Fairbank, and Nathaniel
Peffer, lost their reputations for expertise.

Famous institutions, such as the

Institute o f Pacific Relations, were destroyed. Even some important government
officials’ careers were terminated, including famous Chinese experts John T.
Flynn, John Stewart Service and O. Edmund Clubb. Even Secretary Acheson
came under severe attack. According to historian Tang Tsou, “many Americans
expressed their anxieties over Far Eastern affairs by accepting McCarthy’s theory
of conspiracy as a salve to their wounded pride and by acclaiming or acquiescing
in his hunt for non-existent Communists in the State Department as a substitute
for a search for a workable policy.”30

Public opinion polls showed that

McCarthy’s charges did have support from Americans.

Among 84 percent of

those who had heard McCarthy’s charges, 39 percent thought that his “exposure”
o f Communists a good thing for the country. The Gallup Poll also reported that
“among college-trained persons interviewed, 41 percent said they thought the
McCarthy charges [were] harmful, while 46 percent said they [were] a good thing
for the country, and 13 percent [had] no opinion.”31 Another poll, which was
done in June 1950, showed that the 78 percent of people who had heard about the
charges approved or believed them. These data revealed that the fear of Russian
or Communist penetration had captured the minds of many Americans. Because

30 Tang Tsou, America’s Failure in China 1941-1950. Vol.2 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1963), p.539.
31 The Gallun Poll: Public Opinion 1935-1970. pp.911-912.
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o f this, historian Claude A. Buss points out that recognition o f the PRC became a
kind o f political litmus test: “those who opposed it [recognition] were politically
wholesome, true-blue pro-Americans, and those who supported it were politically
dubious, pink pro-Communist.”32 Under such circumstances, it was hard for the
Secretary o f State to seek accommodation with Communist China in the time
when Americans were strongly anti-Communist.
Why did the public overwhelmingly support McCarthy’s charges?
Historian Ross Y. Koen points out that the Chinese Nationalists effectively
exploited the weaknesses o f American fears, beliefs, and disillusionment:
The Chinese planned and executed the exploitation o f their claims and grievances
through the skillful use o f Americans who, motived by fear, ambition, missionary
zeal, and the desire for profitable markets, were disgruntled and upset at what
they considered the loss o f China.33

In other words, the Nationalists exploited the myth o f a special American
relationship with China to achieve their political aims. The loss o f the potential
Chinese market to Communism supplied the opportunity for the rise of
McCarthyism.

The reason McCarthyism overwhelmed the opinions o f East

Asian or Chinese experts and expelled them from the decision-making process,
however, was simple: popular anti-intellectualism among Americans. McCarthy
appealed to American beliefs that the United States was formed upon the wisdom
o f the common man, the so-called “yeoman farmer,” who used common sense in

32 Claude A. Buss, China: The People’s Republic o f China and Richard Nixon. (San Francisco: W. H.
Freeoan and Company, 1972), p. 74.
33 Koen, The China Lobby in American Politics, p. 198.
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solving problems.

'XA

Americans distrusted intellectuals because intellectuals tend

to express simple things in complicated ways and because they usually displayed
a sense of superiority to ordinary people. As a result, common people suspected
the experts’ advise and rebelled against intellectuals’ manipulation.
With McCarthyism, Americans swept aside their best advisers, who
suggested a realistic policy to deal with Communist China, and weakened their
foreign policy institutions.

It also reduced the willingness of American

intellectuals to suggest a new China policy. Koen concludes that McCarthyism,
together with the work of the China Lobby and the China Bloc, “seriously
affected the ability o f the vast majority o f China specialists in the United States to
continue

to

provide

the American people

with objective

reports

and

interpretations o f events in China.”35 Indeed, the China Lobby, the China Bloc
and McCarthyism were the strongest internal forces in preventing official
recognition of Communist China.
The Chinese Nationalists also made use o f the internal political rivalry
between the Republican Party and the Democratic Party to achieve their political
aim o f acquiring American protection. In order to discredit the Democrats, the
Republicans blindly attacked Truman’s China policy and supported McCarthy’s
unreasonable charges. Even after Truman had left office, McCarthyism and the
Communist hysteria continued under

the

Republican President Dwight

34 “Yeoman farmers” referred to those farmers, who owned their own piece of land, were economically and
politically independent.
35 Koen, The China Lobby in American Politics, p. 198.
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Eisenhower’s administration. As a result, the Republican president was “forced
to continue all the concessions made by [his] predecessors and add new
[concession] o f [his] own,” according to historian Ross Y. Koen.

'\£ \

To a great

extent, Eisenhower’s failure to recognize the PRC when he entered the White
House in 1953 was closely related to the impact of McCarthyism and the work of
the China Lobby.

In short, the strong domestic pressures that prevented

Acheson’s attempt to make accommodations extended the non-recognition policy
from January to June in 1950 and continued to affect U.S. China policy for years
to come.
If the China Lobby, the China Bloc, McCarthyism and the Communist
hostile actions were forces that prevented the Truman administration from
coming to any kind o f accommodation with the PRC, the Korean War, which
began on June 25, 1950, was the death-blow. North Korean troops, equipped with
Soviet weapons, attacked South Korea. The South Koreans, surprised and poorly
equipped, retreated rapidly. Washington reacted immediately. On June 25 and
June 27, the Security Council o f the United Nations with the Soviet Union absent
decided to give air and sea support to the troops o f the South Korean Government
with the objective to resume its “status prior to the invasion from the north and of
re-establishing the peace broken by that aggression.”37 As a result, the United

36 Ibid., p.209.
37 Address by Dean Acheson, “Act of Aggression in Korea,” Department of State Bulletin. Vol.XXIII,
N o.575 (July 10, 1950), p.46.
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States together with other western powers, entered the war and attacked North
Korean forces under the banner of the United Nations.
Secretary Acheson interpreted North Korean’s attack as “part o f the world
strategy o f international communism.” He strongly believed that if the members
o f the United Nations did not protect South Korea, such aggressive methods
no

would be used elsewhere.

His interpretation was supported by a long report

prepared by the National Security Council on August 25,1950:
USSR action in regard to Korea, and its employment o f satellite forces there,
should be regarded not as an isolated phenomenon but possibly as part o f a
general plan which might involve correlated action in other parts o f the world.39

The NSC believed that the Korean War was not a local war but a war o f Soviet
expansion.

The report argued that the United States should check Soviet

expansion in Asia. It also mentioned the possibility that Communist China would
enter the war under Soviet direction.40 It meant that Washington had already
predicted the possibility that the Chinese would enter the conflict but on wrong
assumptions.
In order to justify his decision to enter the Korean War, President Truman
presented the grand aim of American intervention in Korea as a struggle for
human liberty:
Our men, the men o f other free nations, are defending with their lives the cause o f
freedom in the world. They are fighting for the proposition that peace shall be the
law o f this earth.41
38 Ibid., pp.49-50.
39 U.S. Department o f State, Foreign Relations of the United States. 1950. Vol.I, p.379.
40 Ibid., p.382.
41 Address by Harry Truman, “Act of Aggression in Korea,” Department of State Bulletin. Vol.XXIII,
N o.575 (September 11, 1950), p.407.
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These were words which Americans wanted to hear. According to the opinion
poll, in September 1950, 65 percent o f the population believed that intervention
was not a mistake and 64 percent believed that they should continue the
fighting42
Just shortly after the attack, Truman made a very important decision by
ordering the Seventh Fleet to enter the Taiwan Strait. He instructed the navy to
“defend Taiwan against invasion or attack by the Chinese Communists” and to
“insure that Taiwan will not be used as a base o f operations against the China
mainland.”43 Truman’s decision indeed reversed his “hands-off’ announcement
o f January 5, 1950. Dean Rusk, the Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs,
explained the President’s decision:
In order to insure that United Nations forces operation in Korea would not be
heavily threatened from an important flank position and in order that in that
period o f crisis there would not be a sudden shift in the military position o f
Formosa, the President ordered the Seventh Fleet to insure the military
neutralization o f that island and to protect the flank o f United States forces in
Korea.44

Rusk’s explanation seemed to be reasonable.

The impact o f this decision,

however, was detrimental. Even before sending the Navy, John Foster Dulles, a
consultant to the Secretary o f State, had already concluded that there was a risk of
Chinese intervention. Dulles, nevertheless, stressed that “sometimes such a risk
has to be taken in order to preserve peace in the world and keep the national

42 The Gallup Poll: Public Opinions. 1935-1970. pp.950-951.
43 Statement by Harry Truman, Department of State Bulletin. Vol.XXIII, N o.575 (July 31, 1950), p. 165.
44 Remarks by Dean Rusk, “Security Problem in Far East Areas.” Department of State Bulletin. Vol.XXIII,
No.596 (December 4, 1950), p.892.
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prestige required if we are to play our indispensable part in sustaining a free
world.”45

These words clearly reflected that within Dulles’ mind, national

prestige and honor were far more important than the risk of expanding the war.
In this sense, national prestige overruled any actual strategic concerns.
Aggressive leadership became American foreign policy’s direction.
The response o f the Beijing government to Truman’s military actions was
indignant.

They charged that “the United States o f America [had] invaded

Chinese territory, violated Chinese sovereignty, and [was] threatening China’s
security.”46 Beijing denounced the United States for supporting the Nationalist
blockade o f Shanghai, violating Chinese territorial air-space with repeated
bombings o f Chinese towns and villages in Manchuria since August 28, and
turning the United Nations into an instrument to conceal United States
aggression.47

In response to these charges, Ambassador Warren R. Austin

expressed the willingness o f the United States Government to investigate and
compensate for any destruction and injuries to Chinese citizens.48 Nevertheless,
harm had already been done. The sudden reversal of American policy toward
Taiwan had intensified Beijing’s distrust of American intentions.

Communist

leaders doubted the reliability o f any American declarations.49

45 U.S. Department o f State, Foreign Relations of the United States. 1950. p.Vol.I, p.316.
46 Quotation in a statement by Ambassador Warren R. Austin, “U.S. Appeals to Chinese Communists to
Stop Aggression in Korea,” Department o f State Bulletin. Vol.XXIII, N o.597 (December 11, 1950), p.931.
47 Ibid., p.931.
48 Statement by Austin, “U.S. Appeals to Chinese Communists to Stop Aggression in Korea,” pp.934-935.
49 Tsou, America’s Failure in China, pp.561-562.
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Beijing’s doubts and fears were intensified when Washington decided to
unify Korea by force, regardless o f Beijing’s warnings. Chou En-lai had warned
several times that “the Chinese people absolutely will not tolerate foreign
aggression, nor will they supinely tolerate seeing their neighbor being savagely
invaded by the imperialists.”50 From Chou’s remark, it was clear that Beijing
opposed further American intervention in Korea, but Acheson did not take Chou’s
message seriously.

He regarded the remark as merely a warning, not an

“authoritative statement o f policy.”51 Moreover, since the decision o f unification
was approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations dated October 7,
1950, Acheson believed that forced unification should not be regarded as
aggression. In order to lessen Chinese’s doubt, Truman promised on November
16, 1950 that the United Nations forces would not attack near the Chinese frontier
and United Nations forces would withdraw when Korea was unified.52 Just as
Chou had warned, however, Chinese “volunteers” entered the battlefield in North
Korea in November 1950.
President Truman perceived the intervention as a “new act of aggression
in Korea which was only a part o f a world-wide pattern o f danger to all the free

50 Quoted by Charles R. Kitts, The United States Odyssey in China. 1784-1990. (New York: University
Press o f America, 1991), p. 201.
51 Acheson, Present at the Creation, p.452.
52
Statement by Harry Truman, “To Take Every Step To Prevent Extending Hostilities in the Far East,”
Department o f State Bulletin. Vol.XXIII, N o.595 (November 27, 1950), p. 852.
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nations of the world.”53 In order to secure support from the public, he linked the
Korean War to the American Revolution and simplified the cause:
We fought it for the simple, limited aim o f securing the right to be free, the right
to govern ourselves. We fought it to secure respect for the principles o f the
Declaration o f Independence ... We are not fighting there to conquer China or to
destroy the Soviet Empire. We are fighting for a simple aim —as important to us
today as the goal o f independence was in 1776 —the aim o f securing the right o f
nations to be free and to live in peace.54

Was the war really that simple? If the Americans did not destroy the enemy, how
could it win the war? According to historian Edwin W. McLean, “there was a
pugnacious side to Truman’s character, closely associated with a tendency to
reduce complex subjects to black and white simplicities.”

A large number o f

Americans shared this tendency with Truman. They looked at the world in the
simple terms o f right or wrong, black or white.

Refusing to understand the

radical changes in China, Americans stuck to their myth.
In fact, most Americans at the beginning agreed with Truman, but as time
passed, especially when the Chinese Communists entered the war, they began to
question and retreat. By January 1951, over 66 percent o f interviewed Americans
demanded the administration pull out American troops as soon as possible, and
49 percent believed that the administration had made a mistake in deciding to
defend South Korea.56 People demanded the government stop the fighting and

53 Statement By Harry Truman, “Chinese Communist Attack on Korea: Demands Strengthening o f Free
World’s Defense,” Department of State Bulletin. Vol.XXIII, No.597 (December 11, 1950), p.926.
54 Harry Truman, “The Defense for Freedom,” Department of State Bulletin. Vol.XXV, N o.629 (July 16,
1951), p.84.
55 David McLean, “American Nationalism, the China Myth, and the Truman Doctrine: The Question of
Accommodation with Peking, 1949-1950,” Diplomatic History. Vol X, N o.l (Winter, 1986), p.32.
56 The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1935-1970. pp.960-961.
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negotiate. At the same time, people lost faith in the President’s power of sending
American troops abroad. More than 57 percent o f the interviewers disapproved
o f Truman’s performance.57 Even though the public did not support the war and
his popularity continued to decline, the President did not stop fighting
immediately. Truman and Acheson believed that America still had the power to
win the war because they did not think that the CCP had power to endure. This
time, the President was acting against public opinion. In military and strategy
areas, the administration was less influenced by the public opinion. From this
point onward, it was not only the public who did not want to recognize the PRC,
but also Truman and his officials.
The impact of the Korean War upon Sino-American relations was
significant. Ambassador Philip C. Jessup pointed out that:
The attack upon the Republic o f Korea on June 25, 1950 further aggravated the
situation and constituted additional reasons for [their] non-recognition policy
since it was readily apparent that the Chinese Communists were providing
material and manpower to the North Koreans.58

It became less possible for the United States government to recognize a
Communist regime that supported a United States enemy — North Korea.
Ambassador Jessup further stated that the United States would prevent the seating
o f Communist China in the United Nations.

Consequently, Sino-American

relations continued to be hostile and rough. It was hard, if not impossible, for the

57 Ibid., p.970.
58 Statement by Philip C. Jessup, “U.S. Policy Toward China,” Department of State Bulletin. Vol.XXV,
N o.642 (October 15, 1951), p.606.
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two enemies, who actually fought against each other, to be friends again.59 Since
neither of them was defeated, a peace agreement was not really a peace between
the two countries.

The Korean Armistice Agreement (1953) was not a final

solution to Sino-American hostility. Rather, relations between the two countries
were deeply poisoned by the war.

Dean Rusk, the assistant secretary of Far

Eastern Affairs said on May 28, 1951:
We do not recognize the authorities in Peiping for what they pretend to be. The
Peiping regime may be a colonial Russian government -- a Slavic Manchukuo on
a large scale. It is not the Government o f China. ... It is not Chinese. ... We
recognized the National Government o f the Republic o f China [Taiwan], even
though the territory under its control is severely restricted. We believe it more
authentically represents the view o f the great body o f the people o f China,
particularly their historic demand for independence from foreign control.60

The Korean War strengthened American officials’ belief that Beijing was under
Moscow’s control. John Foster Dulles, who in 1953 became the Secretary of
State in Eisenhower’s administration, likened the Beijing government to the
Wang Ching-wei regime in China during the Second World War. He argued that
although the Wang regime had been “exercising de facto authority over most of
the people o f China,” the United States government believed that it was “the tool
o f Japanese imperialism” and refused to recognize it. Similarly, Dulles argued,
the United States government would not recognize Mao Tse-tung’s regime in
Beijing because it was the tool of Russian imperialism.61

59 The main counter-argument would be America’s relationship with Germany and Japan after the war.
60 Statement by Dean Rusk, “Chinese-American Friendship,” Department o f State Bulletin. Vol.XXIV,
N o.612 (May 28, 1951), p.847.
61 Statement by John Foster Dulles, Department of State Bulletin. Vol.XXIII, N o.598 (December 18, 1950),
p.992.
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Because China and America were fighting each other in the Korean War,
there was no hope for accommodation within a short period o f time. The war
strengthened America’s belief that Beijing was a puppet of Moscow and that the
United States should not recognize the PRC.

The war also strengthened the

power o f the China Lobby, the China Bloc, and McCarthyism in the United
States. Thus, even after the war, under Eisenhower’s administration, the United
States government still refused to recognize China and did not allow it to enter
the United Nations.
In short, the strong China myth distorted Americans’ vision about the
radical changes in China and gave domestic forces such as the China Lobby, the
China Bloc, and Senator McCarthy a chance to gain key influence over United
States foreign policy.

If these domestic political pressures discouraged the

Truman administration from traveling the road o f accommodation, the seizure of
American property in Beijing and the outbreak o f the Korean War swept away the
road and confirmed the Non-Recognition policy as the primary direction of
American China policy for the next twenty years.

CONCLUSION

The purpose o f this essay has been to show how the China myth
influenced America’s perception about the rise of Communist China, and how the
myth aided the rise o f McCarthyism and ensured the success o f the China Lobby
and the China Bloc in the United States. I have argued that foreign policy is not
merely a reaction to external challenges but also an extension of American
ideology and culture.

Domestic political pressures, which shaped by public

perception toward China, worked hand in hand with external challenges in
affecting President Truman’s China policy during an era o f uncontrollable
changes. It kept the administration away from any kind of accommodation and
prevented the government from recognizing the new Communist regime in China.
Although Truman’s administration tried very hard to find the best possible
way to deal with this new regime, there were too many factors to be balanced
effectively. Even though President Truman and Secretary Acheson themselves
were strongly anti-Communist, they perceived a need to deal with the new China
practically. Therefore, from November 1949 to January 1950, they struggled to
find ways of creating some kind of accommodation with the PRC. The response,
however, was negative. The Ward incident and the seizure o f American property
aroused public discontent.

The administration reacted to this challenge

emotionally by withdrawing all American officials from China.

The China

Lobby, the China Bloc, and Senator McCarthy’s charges kept the administration’s
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attention away from the policy o f accommodation. The outbreak o f Korean War
in June 1950 further worsened the situation and ultimately, swept away any hope
o f accommodation when the two countries became engaged on the battlefield.
From that point onward, the administration stuck to the Non-Recognition policy
and blocked the PRC entrance into the United Nations.
The Non-Recognition policy demonstrated the way Americans looked at
themselves and the way they looked at others. In fact, recognition has long been
used by Washington as a tool for protecting American interests.

American

experiences during the Revolution and the Civil War, as well as their relations
with the Caribbean gave Americans strong faith in the policy o f using recognition
as a diplomatic tool. In facing the issue o f whether to recognize the Communist
regime in China, Washington policy-makers believed that attaching conditions to
recognition was the best possible way to pressure the Communists to yield to
American demands because they assumed that the Chinese needed American
economic support. Washington also believed that without American recognition
the Communist regime in Beijing would not last long. Since America was the
leader o f the free world, it should uphold the “united front” in not recognizing the
Communists. This belief prevented Ambassador Stuart’s visit to Beijing in July
1949.

Because the Beijing government refused to honor western diplomatic

practice and disregarded all the treaties signed by the previous Chinese
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government with the West, America would not recognize the PRC and prevented
it from entering the United Nations.
Emotionally speaking, Americans could not understand why China was
lost to Communism. They tried to explain it by the theory o f Soviet expansion.
They continued to indulge in their myth o f a special relationship with the Chinese
and kept on waiting for the Chinese to return by rebelling against the Soviet
Union. Because of the China myth, Americans believed the claims of the China
Lobby and McCarthy and were willing to protect and support the corrupt
Nationalist regime in Taiwan. Believing itself the leader o f the free world with
an obligation to contain the spread of Communism, America was willing to send
its boys to Korea and later to Vietnam. It was not a matter of right or wrong
decision, but a matter of making a choice. Americans made their own choice
based on their own ideology, myth, and culture.

Therefore, if we want to

understand American foreign policy, we have to understand the American people
first. Within a democratic system, it is the American people who influence the
making American foreign policy.
Looking at Sino-American relations from 1949 to 1953 helps to explain
how Americans and their government reacted to external changes and how
external challenges affected the domestic political environment. Policy makers,
on the one hand, bore distinctive American cultural and ideological baggage, but
they needed to be pragmatic in facing foreign relations problems.

It was this

dilemma that President Truman and Secretary Acheson had to face when they

69
dealt with China. If Truman and Acheson had had the power to foresee what
would happen in the next twenty years, they might have been able to overrule the
domestic pressures and wake up from the myth they enjoyed, but most
importantly, they might have determined to pursue the policy o f accommodation
and recognized the Communist regime in China.
Interestingly, historians have come to realize the importance of cultural
and ideological factors in analyzing American foreign relations, rather than
simply looking at political, economic, and strategic factors. The period of SinoAmerican hostility following the Chinese Civil War tells us that in order to find
the best possible policy for dealing with a foreign country, the decision-makers
not only need to consider political, economic, and strategic factors, but also need
to understand the culture and ideology of their own and opposing countries. This
is the best way to minimize misperception and misunderstanding. The period of
hostility following the Chinese Civil War was indeed a good history lesson for
today’s policy makers to learn how to deal with today’s Communist China. When
the two countries are now arguing over the issues, such as intellectual property
rights, prison labor, child abuse, and personal liberties, American officials should
keep in mind cultural and ideological differences and should try to understand
and accept these differences rather than speaking with deaf ears.
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